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Whether uncertainty about fundamentals plays a role in currency crises is an issue with
important implications for both the theoretical and the empirical literature in international
¿nance. The matter is also critical for policy purposes. For example, if uncertainty about
fundamentals increases the probability of a speculative attack, then exchange rate regimes
will be more vulnerable in periods of greater uncertainty and policymakers should adjust their
policies accordingly. Moreover, to the extent that public authorities control the precision of
information about fundamentals, a relevant role of uncertainty in currency crises may carry
implications for the optimal degree of transparency, the disclosure policy, as well as the
timeliness of data releases.
In this paper, we study the effect of uncertainty about fundamentals with a dataset
that includes forecasts of key macro variables for six Asian countries gathered by Consensus
Economics. Figures 1 and 2 show that during the Asian crisis not only expected GDP growth
deteriorated, but also the growth outlook became more uncertain, with a large increase in the
dispersionof forecasts.
2 Thequestionweaddress is whether theincreasein uncertainty (Figure
2) played a role in determining exchange rate pressures that is additional to the deterioration
of the mean of expected fundamentals (Figure 1).
Whereas almost no empirical paper on currency crises has made uncertainty about
fundamentals its central focus, some have developed theoretical models in which the variance
of fundamentals plays a role. In stochastic “¿rst-generation” models of currency crises,
for example, the variance of fundamentals affects the probability of a speculative attack at
each point in time (Flood and Garber, 1984). In this class of models, greater uncertainty
about fundamentals tends to increase the probability of a speculative attack as long as certain
conditions are satis¿ed.
3 In a recent paper, Flood and Marion (2000) extend Flood and Garber
4 We thank Patrick Bolton, Matteo Bugamelli, Bob Flood, Steve Morris, Hyun Shin, and Nikola Tarashev
for helpful comments. Bianca Bucci, Rosanna Gattodoro, Alessandra Liccardi, and Giovanna Poggi provided
valuable research assistance. Theviews expressed in this paper are those of theauthors and do not necessarily re-
￿ectthoseof the IMF or theBank of Italy. Correspondence: AlessandroPrati (e-mail: aprati@imf.org), Massimo
Sbracia (e-mail: sbracia.massimo@insedia.interbusiness.it).
5 The shaded area marks the period from July 1997 to the end of 1998, which includes the Asian crisis, the
Russian crisis, and the near-collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management. The evolution over time
of the mean and variance of other macro forecasts in the Consensus Economics dataset is similar to that of GDP.
6 In Goldberg (1991), domestic credit growth follows a random walk process with errors distributed as a8
(1984) to show that an increase in the expected post-attack variance of the exchange rate
may lead the economy into an attack equilibrium even if the ¿rst moment of fundamentals
is consistent with a no-attack equilibrium.
4
“Second-generation” models of currency crises have paid less attention to the role of
uncertainty about fundamentals. These models are usually complete information models in
which only the mean of the fundamentals matters (see, for example, Obstfeld (1996)). In a
second-generation model of currency crises with incomplete information, Sbracia and Zaghini
(2001) show that an increase in the variance of public information about fundamentals can
make a unique equilibrium with a speculative attack prevail in a range of parameters in which,
for lower levels of variance, there would be multiple equilibria.
Following Morris and Shin (1998), several papers have considered models with
incomplete public DQG private information about fundamentals. These models would yield
multiple equilibria with complete information, but a unique equilibrium emerges when the
private signal about the state of fundamentals is suf¿ciently precise relative to the public
signal. Nevertheless, “coordination failures” still characterize this unique equilibrium because
the entire structure of beliefs (including the precision of public and private information), and
not only the level of fundamentals, determines whether an attack or a no-attack equilibrium
prevails. Thus, even though there is a unique equilibrium, exchange rate pegs can collapse
for values of fundamentals that would have been consistent with the peg if only speculators’
expectations had been different.
Models à la Morris and Shin provide a natural framework for studying the role of
uncertainty in currency crises, as private information generates empirically plausible equilibria
in which only a fraction of speculators attacks the currency, with or without success. In
models with complete – or incomplete but only public – information, only equilibria in mixed
strategies could have similar features. In addition, the presence of a unique equilibrium allows
displaced exponential with zero mean￿ if the variance of the errors is below an upper bound, greater uncertainty
increases the probability of an attack. In counterfactual simulations Goldberg (1994) ¿nds, however, that a higher
variance of domestic credit growth would have UHGXFHG the probability of an attack in Mexico between 1980
and 1986. In Grilli (1986), fundamentals follow an AR(1) process with normal errors￿ as long as fundamentals
are “good,” the effect of the variance on the probability of an attack is positive, but with suf¿ciently “bad”
fundamentals it may become negative.
7 In the related literature on stochastic target zones, Dumas and Svensson (1994) show that when the vari-
ance of the fundamentals is larger, the expected survival time of a target zone is shorter. Similarly, Bartolini and
Prati (1999) ¿nd that the bene¿ts of soft exchange rate bands decline as the variance of fundamentals increases.9
to perform rigorous comparative statics exercises that are not possible in multiple-equilibrium
models à la Obstfeld (1994 and 1996).
Some recent papers have examined the effect of changes in the precision of public or
private information on the likelihood of a currency crisis in models à la Morris and Shin.
Using a model with a uniform distribution for noisy private signals, Heinemann and Illing
(2002) prove that an increase in the precision of private information reduces the likelihood of
a currency crisis. Morris and Shin (2002a) question, however, the robustness of this result and,
in a somewhat different framework, ¿nd that greater precision of information does not always
attenuate speculators’ coordination problem. Finally, Metz (2002) shows that the effect of
changes in the variance of information on the decision rule of the government depends on
the expected level of fundamentals and on whether it is the public or the private information
precision that varies.
5
In the ¿rst part of the paper, we extend Metz’s result in order to obtain predictions
about the effects of the precision of public and private information on the VKDUH RI VSHFXODWRUV
attacking the currency, which is the correct theoretical counterpart of the indices of exchange
rate pressure that we use in the econometric analysis. In line with Metz (2002), we ¿nd that
the effect of publicinformation depends on theexpected fundamental: when this is suf¿ciently
good (bad), an increase in the precision of public information makes speculative attacks less
(more) likely. In addition, we show that the precision of private information has an effect on
the shareof attacking speculatorssimilar to that of public information, provided that actual and
expected fundamentals are both suf¿ciently good or both suf¿ciently bad. Private information
is predicted to have a different effect only when actual and expected fundamentals are at odds.
To show that our predictions on the effects of the mean and variance of public information
would hold DOVR LQ WKH SUHVHQFH RI PXOWLSOH HTXLOLEULD￿ Appendix I considers the special case
in which there is no private information.
In the second part of the paper, we verify empirically whether uncertainty about
fundamentals contributes to currency crises and whether this effect depends on the level of
expected fundamentals, as the theory predicts. The previous empirical literature on exchange
rate dynamics has not focused on uncertainty with two main exceptions: Hodrik (1989), who
8 In arelated framework, Corsetti etal. (2002) show that the presenceof a“large” speculator makes “small”
speculators more aggressive in their attacking strategy and that the strength of this effect depends on the relative
precision of private information of large and small investors.10
has unsuccessfully tried to use estimated conditional variances of money supply, industrial
production, and consumer prices, to account for the dynamics of the forward exchange
rate premium￿ and Kaminsky and Peruga (1990), who have estimated a GARCH-in-Mean
restricted VAR model. The mainstream empirical literature on currency crises, including
Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), has also generally neglected
the role of uncertainty about fundamentals. The focus on the role of uncertainty in currency
crises then distinguishes our paper from this previous empirical literature. Moreover, in order
to explain exchange rate pressures, we use forward-looking survey forecasts of fundamentals
from Consensus Economics rather than only the current level of fundamentals. This paper
also provides the ¿rst empirical test of models of currency crises à la Morris and Shin. Our
resultscon¿rmthetheoretical predictionsthat boththemean and thevarianceofGDP forecasts
contribute to explaining exchange rate pressures and that the effect of the variance depends on
the level of expected fundamentals.
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing a benchmark model with complete
information and multiple equilibria, Section 2 presents the main theoretical results for the
model with incomplete public and private information and a unique equilibrium. Section 3
derives the testable implications of the latter, relating its predictions to Consensus Economics
forecasts of fundamentals. Section 4 presents the results of our estimates of exchange rate
pressures in six Asian countries (Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Hong Kong)fortheperiod January1995 -May2001, forwhich ConsensusEconomicsforecast
data are available. Section 5 concludes.
￿￿ 7KHRUHWLFDO EDFNJURXQG
Our simple formulation of a currency crisis game builds on Morris and Shin (2002a) and
Metz (2002). We ¿rst consider a complete information model with multiple equilibria. We
then assume that speculators receive both public and private information and characterize the
unique equilibrium that emerges when private information is suf¿ciently precise.
Our incomplete information analysis focuses on the effects of changes in three key
parameters: the mean of speculators’ expectations about the fundamentals and the precisions
of public and private information.
6 An improvement in the PHDQ of speculators’ expectations
9 Appendix I shows that changes in the ¿rst two parameters tend to have comparable effects in a model11
always makes speculative attacks less likely. The effect of the SUHFLVLRQ RI SXEOLF LQIRUPDWLRQ
depends, instead, on the expected fundamental: when this is suf¿ciently good (bad), an
increasein theprecision of public information makes speculativeattacks less (more) likely. By
extending previous results, we ¿nd that the SUHFLVLRQ RI SULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ has two distinct
effects. First, it affects the likelihood of an attack GLUHFWO\, since it is inversely related to the
dispersion of speculators’ private signals around the actual fundamental. Second, it affects
the likelihood of an attack LQGLUHFWO\, as the ratio between the precision of public and private
informationrepresentstheextent towhichspeculators expect their beliefs tobesharedbyother
speculators, thereby in￿uencing their “degree of aggressiveness.” We show that while these
two effects have opposite consequences on the likelihood of an attack, the net effect of private
information tends to be similar to that of public information, provided that actual and expected
fundamentals are either both suf¿ciently good or both suf¿ciently bad￿ otherwise, the effect of
private information precision turns out to be opposite to that of public information precision.
2.1 &RPSOHWH LQIRUPDWLRQ PRGHO
Let us consider a continuum of speculators in an economy characterized by a state of
fundamentals w that can take values over the real line ?, with w ’n 4 corresponding to
a situation of “sound fundamentals.” We assume that public authorities (“the government”)
are pegging the exchange rate and that speculators decide whether or not to attack it. If a
speculator attacks and the government abandons the peg, the speculator obtains ( ￿ |, with
(:|:f￿ when the attack is not successful, the speculator loses the transaction cost |.
7 If
speculators refrain from attacking, they get f. The government’s utility from defending the
currency is increasing in the fundamental w, and decreasing in the share of speculators that
attack the currency, denoted by ,. Speci¿cally, we assume that the government gets w ￿ ,,
when he maintains the peg and zero when he abandons it.
We consider a very simple two-stage game with complete information. In the ¿rst stage,
speculators observe w and simultaneously decide whether to attack the currency. In the second
where there is only public information and multiple equilibria are possible.
: Here we take G constant. Assuming that G depends on the level of fundamentals ￿ (as in Morris and
Shin, 1998) does not alter the results of the complete and the incomplete public information games. The model
with both public and private information, instead, becomes too complicated to be solved analytically.12
stage,thegovernment –whoknowsw –observestheshareofspeculatorsattacking thecurrency
and decides whether or not to maintain the peg.
This game can be solved backward, by ¿nding the government’s optimal strategy, which




DEDQGRQ,i fw ￿ ,
GHIHQG,o t h e r w i s e .
Given ￿, the solution of the reduced-form game of speculators provides the tripartition of
the space of fundamentals that characterizes second generation models of currency crises.
Speci¿cally, since , 5 dfc￿o,w e¿nd that if the fundamental w lies in:
9
– E￿4cfo ’, there is a unique equilibrium: all agents attack the currency and the
government devalues￿
– Efc￿o ’, there are multiple equilibria: agents can either attack the currency (and force a
devaluation) or refrain from attacking (and allow the peg to be maintained)￿
– E￿cn4￿’ , there is a unique equilibrium: all agents refrain from attacking and the
government maintains the peg.
Hence, outside the interval Efc￿o, maintaining the currency peg is solely a function of the
fundamental w. By contrast, when w falls in Efc￿othe outcome depends on which self-ful¿lling
equilibrium speculators coordinate. If speculators expect the exchange rate peg to fail, they
attack the currency and force the government to devalue. If they expect the peg to hold, they
do not attack the currency and allow the government to maintain the peg.
2.2 ,QFRPSOHWH SXEOLF DQG SULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ
We now assume that speculators do not know the fundamental w but only have
expectations about it, given by the following normal probability distribution
X ￿ ￿Jo6E+c￿*k￿ ,
; We assume – without altering the analysis – that the government chooses to abandon the peg when he is
indifferent.
< Hereafter we restrict our attention to pure strategies.13
with k:f.S i n c e X is common knowledge to all speculators, this probability distribution
represents the SXEOLF LQIRUPDWLRQ available to them. Thus, we will refer to k as the “precision
of public information.” Suppose also that each speculator ￿ receives a SULYDWH VLJQDO %￿ drawn
from the following normal distribution
f￿ m w ￿ ￿Jo6Ewc￿*q￿ ,
with f￿ and f￿ independent given w for each ￿ 9’ ￿,a n dq:f representing the “precision of
private information.” Note that by setting either k ’n 4 or q ’n 4 (or both) we get back
to the complete information model.
In this paper, we do not use the term SXEOLF LQIRUPDWLRQ as a synonym for RI¿FLDO
information (i.e., information provided by the authorities of a country or by other national
or international bodies) but as the antonym of SULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ. Public information consists
of signals on the level of fundamentals that are common (publicly observable) to all agents,
whereas private information differs from agent to agent. In this framework, an increase in the
variance of the distribution of public information does QRW necessarily re￿ect noisier of¿cial
information but it could be due to greater uncertainty – common to all agents – about the
economic outlook.
10 Virtually any event that is publicly observable and affects economic
fundamentals – including a currency crisis elsewhere or rumors of political troubles – could
be classi¿ed under that label. The crisis in Thailand, for example, may have made the growth
outlook of other Asian countries equally more uncertain for all agents. At the same time,
uncertainty about thepoliciesthat eachcountrywould followin themidst ofthecrisismay well
have contributed to the overall uncertainty. In this paper, we do not distinguish between these
two sources of uncertainty, both of which would affect the precision of public information.
An implication of this approach is that, unlike Morris and Shin (2002b), we do not perform
welfare analysis on the provision of public information.
Private information in economic models may arise from a variety of sources. In general,
a noisy private signal may represent discrepancies in how public information is interpreted
43 The sharp increase in the dispersion of GDP forecasts in the aftermath of currency crises documented
in Figure 2 may re￿ect an increase in “model uncertainty” (i.e., an increase of the uncertainty about the “true”
model of Asian economies), as de¿ned by Routledge and Zin (2001). In the theoretical framework of our paper,
an increase in model uncertainty may translate into a higher variance of public or private information, depending
on whether uncertainty increased in a similar or different way across agents.14
by different speculators. Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999)
¿nd empirical support for such heterogeneous processing of public information. Costs of
information acquisition may also produce heterogeneity in speculators’ information sets, as
documented by Kaufmann et al. (2000). Moreover, on foreign exchangemarkets, international
banks may gather valuableprivate information from monitoring theactivity of their customers.
When private information is suf¿ciently precise with respect to public information, this
model entails a unique equilibrium.
11 As was ¿rst shown by Carlsson and van Damme (1993),
this result is driven by the lack of common knowledge induced by the presence of private
information. Appendix II illustrates why the lack of common knowledge leads to a unique





The intuition for this condition is straightforward. If private signals were not suf¿ciently
informative with respect to the public signal, speculators would regard them as unreliable
and continue to ground their decisions mostly on public information, restoring a high degree
of common knowledge. Under condition (1), the following proposition holds (see Appendix
II):
I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tw
W 5 dfc￿o. As a consequence of the unique equilibrium
result, the maintenance of the currency peg depends solely on the actual fundamental w and
the parameters +, k,a n dq. Therefore, speculators’ expectations matter, as changes in the
mean and in the precisions of public and private information determine the equilibrium trigger
points w
W and %W. Note also that the existence of a unique equilibrium does not eliminate
all the “inef¿ciencies” of the model: when w
W 5 Efc￿￿ we can still have currency crises
(for f ￿w￿w
W) that could have been avoided with complete information and speculators
coordinating on the good equilibrium.
12
44 Usingasomewhatdifferentframework, Chan andChiu(2002) show thatifthecompleteinformationgame
does not include WZR regions characterized by a unique equilibrium, then private information – no matter how
precise – would result in a unique equilibrium. In other words, for the unique-equilibrium result it is also crucial
that there be a non-negative probability of ￿ belonging to +￿4>3, and to +4>.4,. This condition is ful¿lled
when we assume normal distributions.
45 Morris and Shin (2002a) further show that the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is also the
unique strategy pro¿le that survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies, which is a stronger equilibrium
concept. For instance, in a related framework Heinemann and Illing (2002) exploit this property to show that the15
The presence of a unique equilibrium allows for rigorous comparative statics.
Speci¿cally, by assuming that condition (1) holds – so that the existence of unique values
for w
W and %W is granted – we can study the effects of the parameters +, k,a n dq on w
W and
%W. Most importantly, we can calculate the effects of the parameters on the probability that
speculator ￿ will attack, ￿hEf￿ ￿ %W m w￿. This probability represents WKH VKDUH RI VSHFXODWRUV
DWWDFNLQJ WKH FXUUHQF\ and, therefore, has an empirical counterpart in indices of exchange rate
pressure.
2.2.1 ([SHFWDWLRQ HIIHFWV RQ WKH HTXLOLEULXP
Wenowshowthat bothw
W and%W are decreasingin + and thattheeffectof theprecisionof
public information depends on the expected fundamental: if + is suf¿ciently good (bad), then
an increase in k makes w
W and %W decrease (increase). Moreover, we prove that an increase
in the precision of private information q has the reverse effect, making w
W and %W increase
(decrease) when + is suf¿ciently good (bad).
The three conditions for k to reduce w
W and %W,f o rq to raise w

















































￿ r￿ . (4)
More precisely, the effects of expectations on the trigger point of the government’ss t r a t e g y ,
w
W, can be summarized by the following result by Metz (2002):
Proposition 1 (Metz, 2002) $VVXPH WKDW q:k2
2Z￿ 7KHQ w
W LV￿ ￿L￿ GHFUHDVLQJ LQ +￿￿ L L ￿
GHFUHDVLQJ ￿LQFUHDVLQJ￿ LQ k LI +:r ￿ ￿+￿r ￿￿￿ ￿LLL￿ LQFUHDVLQJ ￿GHFUHDVLQJ￿ LQ q LI +:r 2
￿+￿r 2￿￿
introductionofsunspots(correlationdevicesunrelatedtofundamentals)doesnotrestoremultiplicityofequilibria.
46 Note that, if G @5 w, the conditions (2), (3), and (4) coincide.16
The effects of the parameters on the decision rule of speculators (i.e. on the trigger point
%W), which are crucial to the theoretical results on the share of attackers presented in the next
section, are given by the following proposition (see Appendix III):
Proposition 2 $VVXPH WKDW q:
k2
2Z￿ 7KHQ %W LV￿ ￿L￿ GHFUHDVLQJ LQ +￿ ￿LL￿ GHFUHDVLQJ
￿LQFUHDVLQJ￿ LQ k LI +:r ￿ ￿+￿r ￿￿￿ ￿LLL￿ LQFUHDVLQJ ￿GHFUHDVLQJ￿ LQ q LI +:r ￿ ￿+￿r ￿￿￿
The effects of the parameters on w
W and %W are essentially the same. The most striking
result from these propositions concerns the opposite effects of k and q. Key to this result is
t h er o l eo fFRRUGLQDWLRQ in currency crisis games. In deciding whether to attack the currency,
speculators need to consider not only their own expectations about fundamentals, but also
what other speculators expect about fundamentals, what other speculators expect about others’
expectations about fundamentals, and so on. These expectations depend on the parameters k
and q, which can assume values that either strengthen or weaken the beliefs of each individual
ontheotherspeculators’decisionto attackthecurrency. Forexample, ifonespeculatorexpects
others to have similar beliefs, he will be more inclined to act on them.
These beliefs about the beliefs of others depend on the ratio between the precision of the
two signals,
k
q, because this ratio determines the relative weight assigned to public and private
information in the posterior beliefs and, in turn, the extent to which individuals can expect








Suppose that + is suf¿ciently high (i.e., conditions (2)-(4) hold) so that speculators will on
average expect “good” fundamentals. In this situation, if the precision ratio
k
q is also high,
speculators know that other speculators have formed their expectations attributing a large
weight to the “good” public signal + and will be less inclined to attack the currency. As a
result, speculators will be less aggressive. By contrast, if
k
q is low, speculators will be less
inclined to rely on the “good” public signal +, because they know that the others are assigning
a large weight to their random private signals. In other words, coordination on a “good”
public signal is more dif¿cult when the random component %￿ in each individual expectation
carries a large weight. The same reasoning applies when + is “bad”￿ in this case, relatively17
precise private (public) information helps (hurts) the government by making it harder (easier)
for speculators to coordinate the attack on the currency.
14
2.2.2 ([SHFWDWLRQ HIIHFWV RQ WKH VKDUH RI DWWDFNHUV
We can now derive the effects of the parameters on the share of speculators attacking the





. This probability depends on the actual fundamental w and on the parameters




it is easy to
obtain:
Proposition 3 $VVXPH WKDW q:
k2
2Z￿ WKHQ WKH SUREDELOLW\ ￿hEf￿ ￿ %W m w￿ LV￿ ￿L￿ GHFUHDVLQJ
LQ w￿ ￿LL￿ GHFUHDVLQJ LQ +￿ ￿LLL￿ GHFUHDVLQJ ￿LQFUHDVLQJ￿ LQ k LI +:r ￿ ￿+￿r ￿￿￿ ￿LY￿ GHFUHDVLQJ

















As expected, an improvement in w or in + reduces the share of speculators attacking the
currency. Similarly, the effect of the precision of public information is in line with previous
results, since it only depends on the expected fundamental +: when + is suf¿ciently good
(bad), an increase in k causes the share of speculators to decrease (increase). However,
unlike the prediction of Propositions 2 and 3, the effect of the precision of private information
is not necessarily opposite to that of public information. In order to understand this new
result, we need to consider that q not only affects the equilibrium trigger point %W (thus
indirectly in￿uencing the share of speculators attacking the currency) but also directly affects
the probability of receiving a private message smaller than %W, ￿hEf￿ ￿ %W m w￿, since it
determines the dispersion of the messages %￿ around the actual fundamental w.
Consider the following example. Assume that + is good (+:r ￿), so that an increase in
q causes %W to increase (
_%W
_q : f), making speculators more aggressive for any w. One might
47 Heinemann and Illing (2002) obtain a different result on the effect of private information: in their model
an increase in the precision of private information, ￿, alwaysdecreases ￿
￿, making speculative attacksless likely.
However, Heinemann and Illing assume that ￿ is uniformly distributed over the unit interval. In the terms of our
model, this assumption would correspond to a ¿xed |, set equal to 4@5. Hence, their result is consistent with
our model – which, for a ¿xed |, predicts that an increase in ￿ always reduces ￿
￿, provided that condition (3) is
not ful¿lled. It should also be noted that when uncertainty is high the model of Heinemann and Illing tends to
favor the attack strategy pro¿le because speculators’ payoffs, given a successful attack, are assumed to depend
negatively on ￿. This means that if the attack is successful and ￿ is low, speculators get a large payoff, whereas
they lose only the transaction cost w if the attack is not successful. As a result, in that model an increase in
uncertainty – making extreme values of ￿ more likely – tends to drive speculators to the attack strategy.18
expect that theshare of speculatorsattacking thecurrency would also increase. Nevertheless, if
the actual fundamental w is suf¿ciently good (w:% W) ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nq reduces the dispersion
of the distribution around the good fundamental, so a larger number of speculators receive
good signals. When this second effect is strong enough, it offsets the indirect effect of q on %W,
and the resulting share of attackers decreases. Figure 3 illustrates of the effect of an increase
in q for a good value of +. When q rises, the resulting increase in %W (indirect effect) tends to
increase the share of attackers for each value of w (dotted line). However, as a consequence of
the direct effect, the slope of the curve changes, so that the share of attackers increases only
for low values of w and decreases for high ones.
In general, the net effect of an increase in q on the share of speculators depends on
the relative strength of these two effects. When the direct effect prevails, the effect of the
precision of private information is analogous to that of public information. Note, also, that the
direct effect tends to prevail either when w and + are both suf¿ciently good or when they are
both suf¿ciently bad. Conversely, the effect of the precision of private information tends to be
opposite to that of public information when the indirect effect dominates, which occurs when
w is good and + is bad or vice versa.
￿￿ 7HVWDEOH LPSOLFDWLRQV
We use forecasts of fundamentals collected by Consensus Economics to verify whether
the mean and variance of agents’ expectations contribute to explaining actual exchange
rate pressures. The Consensus Economics dataset gathers individual forecasts of economic
variables (GDP, current account, in￿ation, ...) formulated by a set of professional forecasters.
To relate these predictions to the theoretical model of Section 2.2, we assume that each
forecaster declares to Consensus Economics the mean of his posterior probability distribution.
(If the forecasters had strategic objectives and chose their forecasts following any of the
strategies considered in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001), our testable implications would remain
unchanged.
15) Recall that, given the message %￿, the posterior probability distribution is









48 A formal proof is available from the authors upon request.19
Our assumption implies that the prediction about the fundamental w that agent ￿ (i.e., the agent
receiving the message %￿) reports to Consensus Economics is the posterior mean se
￿ E%￿￿ given

















where ? is the number of forecasters. Given the fundamental w,f o r? that goes to n4 this
random variable converges to:
s Ew￿’. ds







Thus, if ? is suf¿ciently large, by using the mean of the individual forecasts in the
empirical analysis we use a variable that is in￿uenced by w and +. Recall that w and + have
the same effects on the share of attackers: when actual or expected fundamentals improve
(deteriorate), pressures on the exchange rate will abate (strengthen). Note also that the
theoretical model suggests that . ds EX￿o ’ +￿ thus, RQ DYHUDJH the mean of individual
forecasts is equal to the expected fundamental + and does not depend in any systematic way
on k and q. Similarly, in our empirical work we expect that, DORQJ WKH WLPH￿VHULHV GLPHQVLRQ,
the mean of individual forecasts does not depend on k and q.
The theoretical model also implies that the precisions of public and private information
affect exchange rate pressures (points ￿LLL￿￿￿LY￿ in Proposition 4) in a way that is distinct from
that of actual and expected fundamentals (points ￿L￿￿￿LL￿ in Proposition 4). In other words,
Proposition 4 suggests that even if actual and expected fundamentals remain unchanged,
speculative pressures on the exchange rate vary with the variance of public or private
information. Empirically, changes in the precision of public and private information will be
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Hence, for ? suf¿ciently large, a change in + affects the individual forecasts se
￿ but does not
affect their variance j2, which only depends on k and q. According to the model of section
2.2, changes in the mean of the Consensus Economics forecasts shown in Figure 1 cannot
explain coincident changes in the dispersion of the forecasts shown in Figure 2.
It is apparent from expression (8) that while an increase in k always implies a decrease
in j2, an increase in q does not necessarily reduce j2. This result is easily explained. On the
one hand, q tends to reduce j2 as it decreases the dispersion of the messages %￿, but on the
other hand, for given messages %￿,t h er i s ei nq increases the weight of the private messages in
the individual predictions (5), making them more heterogeneous between the forecasters. The
¿rst (second) effect dominates when q:k(q￿k ).







condition q:kensures that j2 is decreasing in q, so that we can always interpret a decline in
j2 as due to an increase in either k or q or both. The condition q:
k2
2Z ensures the existence
of a unique equilibrium and that Proposition 4 holds.
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From Proposition4 we knowthat theeffect of j2 on speculativepressureswill depend on
whether it is k or q that changes and on the level of the expected fundamental +. We therefore
estimate a speci¿cation of the following general form:






|3￿ ￿ ￿￿n￿￿e|3￿ n 0| (9)
where .-￿ is a measure of exchange rate pressure, se is the mean of the individual forecasts
from(6), je is the standard deviation corresponding to the square root of (7), ￿ is the threshold
separating “good”from “bad” expected fundamentals, and e is the real effective exchangerate.
All regressors are lagged one period to avoid simultaneity bias.
Weexpect thecoef¿cient ￿￿ to be negativebecausean improvement in theexpected level
of fundamentals eases the pressure on the exchange rate.
The effect of an increase in the dispersion of the individual forecasts, je, depends on
the expected fundamental and on the source of uncertainty. The parameter ￿ is the empirical
49 Appendix I shows that the variance of public information has similar effects in a model with only public
information, independentlyofthenumberofequilibria. However, apropertestofamodelwithmultipleequilibria
would require a different econometric approach, one allowing for jumps across multiple equilibria.21
proxy for the right-hand side of equations (2) and (4). If changes in the precision of SXEOLF
information are at the origin of most changes of je in our sample, then ￿2 should be positive,
because by Proposition 4 imprecise public information (i.e., a high je due to a low k) with
good expected fundamentals (i.e., se
|3￿ :￿ ) heightens exchange rate pressures. We also
expect ￿2 to be positive if the changes in je are due to changes in the precision of SULYDWH
information while actual and expected fundamentals are either both suf¿ciently good or both
suf¿ciently bad, so that the GLUHFW HIIHFW of q on the likelihood of an attack dominates (see
previous section). In principle, ￿2 could be negative if changes in je were due to changes in
the precision of SULYDWH information and actual and expected fundamentals were suf¿ciently
different in most of the sample (i.e., either the actual fundamental is good and the expected
fundamental is bad or the actual fundamental is bad and the expected fundamental is good).
In the theoretical model the probability of a speculative attack also depends on the
potential gains in the event of a successful attack, namely (￿|. Onecan show that an increase
in the potential gross pro¿t ( makes an attack more likely. As an indicator of potential gross
pro¿ts we select the real effective exchange rate e.A r i s e i n e, i.e. a decrease in external
competitiveness, may signal to speculators that the devaluation of the currency will be greater
when the exchange rate regime collapses. Thus, if transaction costs | are constant, a rise in
e may represent an increase in speculators’ potential gains. Since speculative pressures are
increasing in potential gains, we expect ￿￿ to be positive.
￿￿ (PSLULFDO HYLGHQFH
In this section, we verify whether the mean and variance of agents’ expectations for
economic fundamentals help to explain actual exchange rate pressures. For this purpose,
we build a monthly dataset with indices of exchange rate pressure and means and variances
of Consensus Economics forecasts of GDP growth for six Asian countries (Thailand, South
Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong) from January 1995 to May 2001.
4.1 7KH GDWD
To verify whether expected fundamentals and their dispersion affect the fraction of
speculators that decide to attack the currency, we build an index of exchange rate pressure.
17
4: Girton and Roper (1977), Roper and Turnovsky (1980), and Weymark (1998) discuss the assumptions22
In recent years, several empirical studies have developed indicators of exchange rate pressure
designed to identify and predict crisis periods. In this paper, we follow a similar methodology,
except that we do not transform the index of exchange rate pressure into a discrete zero-
one variable separating tranquil from crisis periods.
18 The reason is that in practice some
speculators attackthe currencywhileothers donot, consistentlywiththepredictionof aprivate
informationmodelinwhich thenumberofspeculatorsattackingacurrencyvariescontinuously
with fundamentals and the distribution of beliefs.
Our index of exchange rate pressure U￿(￿ is the sum of the normalized values of
three indicators of exchange rate pressure:
19 L￿ the percentage depreciation of the domestic
currency against the U.S. dollar over the previous month￿ LL￿ the fall in international reserves
over the previous month as a percentage of the 12-month moving average of imports￿ and LLL￿
the three-month interest rate less the annualized percentage change in consumer prices over
the previous six months. To check the robustness of our results, we also compute an index
U￿(2, which sums only normalized values of L￿ and LL￿,
20 and an index ￿U7, which is the
continuous version of an index recently developed by the Bank for International Settlements
for monitoring purposes.
21 Figure 4 shows the time-series behavior of these three indices.
Every month, Consensus Economics gathers forecasts of a series of macro variables for
the current and the following year. Following Brooks et al. (2001), in order to reproduce a
needed to justify different de¿nitions of indices of exchange rate pressure in theoretical macro models.
4; Another exception is Sachs et al. (1996) who use a weighted sum of the percentage decrease in reserves
and the percentage depreciation of the exchange rate in a cross-country regression.
4< To normalize, we subtract from each indicator the country-speci¿c mean and divide the result by the
country-speci¿c standard deviation.
53 Indices based only on exchange rate and reserve changes are the most common in empirical works on
early warning systems, because of the lack of reliabledata on interest rates for panel datasets with a large number
of developing countries and a long time series dimension. This is the case of the early warning system used by
the IMF (see Berg et al., 2000).
54 The BIS index is based on four indicators of exchange rate pressure: L￿ the percentage depreciation of
the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar over three months￿ LL￿ the percentage depreciation of the domestic
currency against the U.S. dollar over one year￿ LLL￿ the three-month interest rate less the annualized percentage
change in consumer prices over the previous six months￿ and LY￿ the fall in international reserves over three
months as a percentage of the 12-month moving average of imports. The BIS transforms the values of each
indicator into scores that are then weighted to compute an index that can take 21 different values from -10
(maximum appreciating pressure) to +10 (maximum depreciating pressure). Annex B of Hawkins and Klau
(2000) describes the construction of this index in detail. By contrast, we compute a continuous index by adding
normalized values of each of the four indicators of exchange rate pressure.23
constant forecast horizon of one year, we compute a weighted average of current-year and
following-year forecasts with weights equal respectively to 11/12 and 1/12 in January, 10/12
and 2/12 in February, and so on until 0/12 and 12/12 in December.
22 To reduce the effect of
possible outliers, we use the median (rather than the mean) of Consensus Economics forecasts
at each date and the mean absolute median difference as a measure of dispersion. We limit our
analysis to the forecasts of GDP growth. Consensus Economics forecasts for other variables –
in￿ation, current account balance, trade balance, and exports – are available, but the number
of forecasts is generally smaller than for GDP growth, making mean and dispersion measures
less reliable. Moreover, in preliminary estimates, these other variables did not perform as well
as GDP growth and, when measures of the mean and variance of expected GDP growth were
included in the regression, hardly any other forecast variable was signi¿cant.
The real effective exchange rate is computed by JP Morgan and is generally available
with a one-month lag. We found that the overall ¿t using the real effective exchange rate was
marginally better than using the nominal exchange rate with the US dollar, but there was no
difference in terms of the estimated signs and signi¿cance of all other coef¿cients between the
two models. The actual values of GDP growth and other variables used in previous studies –
such as in￿ation, international reserves, the ratio of M2 to international reserves, and the ratio
of BIS external short-term debt to international reserves – had little effect on exchange rate
pressures once we included the mean and variance of expected GDP growth in the regression.
4.2 %HQFKPDUN UHJUHVVLRQ
Our benchmark regression is the following estimated version of equation (9):






C(￿￿c|3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿C(￿
￿
n￿ ￿￿c￿e￿c|3￿ n ￿￿c| , ￿￿c| ’￿ 4￿￿￿c|3￿ n 0￿c| (10)
where U￿(￿￿c| is our three-component index of exchange rate pressure for country ￿ at time
|. First, we estimated this system as a set of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) with
55 Multicollinearity of current-year and following-year forecasts prevents us from including both variables
in the regression. However, very similar results were obtained by including only the following-year forecast,
the current-year forecast, or the following-year forecast together with the difference between the two. In these
cases, the dispersion measures have been seasonally adjusted to account for the smaller dispersion of forecasts –
documented by Loungani (2001) – at the end of the year than at the beginning of the year.24
country-speci¿c coef¿cientsand a country-speci¿c AR(1) term to correct forserial correlation.
We chose the SUR estimation method to allow for the likely correlation of the errors across
countries during the Asian crisis. Second, we performed a Wald test of equality of parameters
across countries, which showed that the coef¿cients ￿ ￿￿ and ￿ ￿2 could be constrained to be
the same across countries (the null hypothesis of equality was accepted with a p-value of
0.745). Table 1 shows the results of this restricted estimation of (10). We use the restrictions
accepted by the data to simplify the presentation and to conduct robustness tests involving
recursive estimation (see below) on a speci¿cation with a limited number of parameters. The
restriction is by no means necessary to obtain statistically signi¿cant coef¿cients. In the
unrestricted estimates, all ￿ ￿￿c￿ (￿ ’￿ c￿￿cS) were negative and statistically signi¿c a n ta tt h e
5 percent con¿dence level and all ￿ ￿2c￿ (￿ ’￿ c￿￿cS) were positive and statistically signi¿cant
at the 1 percent con¿dence level. Note also that uncertainty about GDP growth contributes
considerably to explaining exchange rate pressures: if we set ￿ ￿2 ’fin equation (10), the -2
for the overall system falls from 42.6 to 33 percent.
The results in Table 1 con¿rm that higher expected GDP growth reduces exchange rate
pressures. Most interestingly, these estimates indicate that uncertainty about GDP growth
has an additional effect, which depends on the expected GDP growth, as our theoretical
model predicts. A higher dispersion of GDP growth forecasts tends to increase exchange
rate pressures when expected GDP growth is above the estimated country-speci¿c threshold
and to reduce them when it is below. The threshold is statistically different from zero only
for Singapore. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that changes in the precision
of public information are the main factors behind the time-series variation in the dispersion
of the forecasts￿ or, if it is the precision of private signals that varies, that the direct effect of
precision changes on the distribution of the signals dominates the indirect effect on the trigger
point %W (see Proposition 4).
4.3 6HQVLWLYLW\ DQDO\VLV
This section presents a series of robustness tests of our benchmark speci¿cation (10),
con¿rming our main result that uncertainty about fundamentals plays a role in currency crises
and that this role depends on the expected level of the fundamentals.25
4.3.1 5REXVWQHVV WR DOWHUQDWLYH H[FKDQJH UDWH SUHVVXUH PHDVXUHV￿
Tables 2 and 3 present estimates of the speci¿cation (10) with two alternative measures
of exchange rate pressure as dependent variable (U￿(2 and ￿U7). The coef¿cient measuring
the effect of uncertainty (￿ ￿2) remains positive and strongly signi¿cant. The coef¿cient for the
effect of expected fundamentals (￿ ￿￿) remains negative and signi¿cant.
4.3.2 5REXVWQHVV WR ¿[HG DQG ￿RDWLQJ H[FKDQJH UDWH UHJLPHV￿
Should we test the implications of our model only on the pre-crisis sample? 3ULPD IDFLH,
this approach would be consistent with the model of Section 2.2, in which the government
pegs the exchange rate. Yet, there are theoretical and empirical reasons why the predictions
of this model should be tested on the entire sample. From a theoretical point of view, in a
￿oating exchange rate regime speculators still face a coordination problem: the future value of
the currency and, in turn, their potential pro¿ts depend on how many buy or sell the currency.
Thus, each speculator still plays a coordination game with the others that might result in a
tripartition of the space of fundamentals similar to that of second-generation currency crisis
models. Assume, for instance, there are values of the fundamentals that are so good that an
appreciation is certain, values that are so bad that a depreciation is certain, and values (maybe
most values) for which the outcome depends on how many speculators decide to buy or sell.
Within this model, the mean and variance of speculators’ expectations will produce downward
or upward pressures on the currency similar to those we have obtained in Section 2.2.
From an empirical point of view, some countries in the sample – Hong Kong and
Singapore – never changed their exchange rate regime, while Malaysia repegged its currency
in September 1998.
23 Moreover, the post-crisis regime of the other countries was not a free
￿oat but a managed ￿oat, whose features can still be captured by the model of Section 2.2.
The countries that abandoned pegs recorded the largest out￿ows of international reserves in
the second half of 1997. As a result, for all these countries but South Korea, the greatest drop
in reserves came after the change in the exchange rate regime. In some cases, the depletion of
of¿cial reserves continued in the ¿rst quarter of 1998 and recurred after the Russian crisis.
56 However, during the crisis Singapore claimed to have broadened the undisclosed target band within which
the Singapore dollar was allowed to ￿uctuate.26
These considerations suggest that the full-sample estimates of Tables 1, 2, and 3
represent a meaningful test of the model, but it is still interesting to verify whether our results
would be changed by restricting the analysis to the pre-crisis period 1995:01-1997:07. Table
4 shows the outcome of this exercise. Because of the substantial reduction in the number of
observations, we now also restrict ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿,a n d￿ 4￿ to be the same in all countries, allowing only
the intercepts ￿ ￿fc￿ in each equation to be country-speci¿c. This is equivalent to estimating a
panel model with ¿xed effects. The effect of uncertainty is positive and statistically signi¿cant
in this pre-crisis period as well. The negative effect of better expected fundamentals on
exchange rate pressures is also con¿rmed. These results hold with all measures of exchange
rate pressure and con¿rm that the breakdown of the exchange rate regime in most of the
countries in our panel in the second half of 1997 is not the sole cause of the estimated effect
of uncertainty on exchange rate pressures.
24 This is consistent with the increase in uncertainty
about GDP growth prior to the crisis in Thailand (from mid-1996), South Korea (from end-
1996), and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia (Figure 2). The increase of uncertainty in Hong Kong
– which maintained its currency board for the entire period – provides further evidence that
the breakdown of the exchange rate regime may not be the only cause of the uncertainty we
observe.
We further checked the robustness of our results by re-estimating the benchmark SUR
model of Table 1 with a set of dummies that were set to 1 when a country no longer pegged its
exchange rate. The results were essentially unchanged, ￿ ￿￿ and ￿ ￿2 remaining very signi¿cant.
Nor did the results change when the model in Table 4 was estimated on unbalanced panels
excluding either the observations following the breakdown of each country’s exchange rate
regime or the observations following each country’s maximum currency depreciation. Finally,
the statistical signi¿cance of the pre-crisis recursive estimates of ￿ ￿￿ and ￿ ￿2 (Figure 5) provides
another indication that our results also hold in the pre-crisis sample.
4.3.3 5REXVWQHVV WR G\QDPLF VSHFL¿FDWLRQ DQG VSXULRXV FRUUHODWLRQ￿
The model in Section 2.2 is static, then to correct for serial correlation of the errors,
rather than estimating a dynamic speci¿cation, we included a country-speci¿cA R ( 1 )t e r mi n
our benchmark regression (10). In a possible dynamic extension of our theoretical model,
57 Jeanne and Rose (2002) show, for example, that market expectations should be noisier under a ￿oating
exchange rate regime.27
however, past values of the exchange rate pressure index could contain information about the
stochastic process generating the fundamentals, which speculators would then include in their
learning processes. The empirical counterpart of this theoretical model would be a dynamic
regression speci¿cation with the lagged exchange rate pressure index on the right-hand side.
Estimates of a dynamic version of equation (10) yielded results very similar to those reported
in Table 1 con¿rming sign and statistical signi¿cance of all coef¿cients.
More generally, correcting for serial correlation or including a lagged dependent
variable rules out the possibility that our results might be driven by spurious correlation
between the exchange rate pressure index and uncertainty about fundamentals.
25 The spurious
regression problem would emergeif the exchangeratepressurewereserially correlated and the
uncertainty were a function of exchange rate pressures. In this case, the estimated coef¿cient
on the lagged variance of GDP forecasts would mainly re￿ect the serial correlation of the
exchange rate pressure series. As shown in Hamilton (1994, pp. 561-562), correcting for
serial correlation or including a lagged dependent variable overcomes the potential spurious
regression problem.
4.3.4 7LPH￿YDU\LQJ ￿ ￿￿ DQG ￿ ￿2￿
Another robustness check regards the coef¿cients ￿ ￿￿ and ￿ ￿2. Proposition 4 implies that
the effect of expected fundamentals on exchange rate pressures is always negative but may
vary over time together with the precision of public and private information. We allow for
this possibility by estimating ￿ ￿￿ recursively with state-space techniques. Figure 5 (top panel)
shows that ￿ ￿￿ varies within a relatively narrow range, remaining always negative and strongly
signi¿cant. Similarly, the effect of uncertainty onexchange rate pressures may varydepending
not only on the level of expected fundamentals (for which we control) but also on whether it is
the precision of public or private information that changes and on the difference between the
actual fundamental w and the cutoff point %W. In particular, there may be instances in which
changes in the precision of private information may cause the parameter ￿ ￿2 to turn negative.
We check this possibility by estimating ￿ ￿2 recursively. Figure 5 (bottom panel) shows that
58 This problem is distinct from the possible simultaneous feedback effect of exchange rate pressures onto
the mean and variance of fundamentals, which would cause a potential endogeneity problem that we address by
lagging all regressors.28
the recursive estimated ￿ ￿2 changes over time but remains always positive and signi¿cantly
different from zero.
26
4.3.5 7LPH￿YDU\LQJ WKUHVKROG ￿ ￿￿
The last robustness check is the estimation of the thresholds separating “high” from
“low”expectedGDP growth. Thesearealsolikelytobetime-varying,re￿ecting changesin the
parametersin r￿, r2,a n dr￿, or, more simply, because investors might have revised estimates of
potential growth rates as the crisis progressed. To address this potential concern, we estimate
the six parameters ￿ ￿￿ in (10) recursively (Figure 6). In all countries except Hong Kong,
the estimated thresholds tend to decline until end-1997 before rebounding and stabilizing
below their pre-crisis level. Nevertheless, Table 5 shows that allowing for time-varying
thresholds has little effect on ￿ ￿￿ and ￿ ￿2￿ the latter remains strongly signi¿cant and positive.
Note that the overall estimated effect of je
C(￿￿c|3￿ on exchange rate pressures (measured
by ￿ ￿2 ￿ Ese
C(￿￿c|3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿C(￿c|3￿￿) may also vary with changes in GDP forecasts (se
C(￿￿c|3￿)
and country-speci¿c thresholds (￿ ￿￿C(￿c|3￿
). Figure 7 shows that this estimated effect varies
substantiallyover timebut remains mostlypositive, withtheexceptionof Indonesia in1998-99
and Singapore at end-1998.
￿￿ &RQFOXVLRQ
This paper studies how uncertainty about fundamentals contributes to currency crises,
both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical model shows that speculative attacks
depend not only on the current and the expected level of fundamentals but also on the variance
of speculators’ expectationsabout fundamentals. This varianceaffects exchange ratepressures
in different ways depending on the level of current and expected fundamentals and on whether
it is publicor private informationthat varies indegree of precision. Speci¿cally, iftheexpected
fundamental is suf¿ciently good (bad), then an increase in the precision of SXEOLF information
makes speculative attacks less (more) likely. The effect of the precision of SULYDWH information
is twofold: it affects the likelihood of an attack GLUHFWO\, since it is inversely related to the
dispersion of speculators’ private signals around the actual fundamental, and also LQGLUHFWO\,
59 We also estimated separate recursive coef¿cients a ￿5>m for each country. Because of the smaller number
of observations, the country-speci¿c estimates had larger RMSE bands than those in Figure 6 at the beginning
of the period. The estimated coef¿cients were, however, mostly positive with a statistically signi¿cant negative
coef¿cient only for the early part of the Hong Kong sample.29
as the ratio between the precision of public and private information represents the extent to
which speculators expect their beliefs to be shared, thereby in￿uencing their ‘aggressiveness’.
We ¿nd that while these two effects have opposite consequences on the likelihood of an attack,
the net effect of the precision of private information tends to be similar to that of public
information when actual and expected fundamentals are either both suf¿ciently good or both
suf¿ciently bad. The precision of private information can have an opposite effect only if actual
and expected fundamentals are at odds, which is unlikely to happen on a regular basis.
Our estimates on a monthly dataset of forecasts for six Asian countries con¿rm that both
the mean and the variance of agents’ expectations about economic fundamentals contribute
to explaining exchange rate pressures. Speci¿cally, exchange rate pressures diminish with an
improvement in the expected rate of GDP growth, and increase with the dispersion of GDP
growth forecasts when expected growth is relatively high.
Estimates of the threshold separating good from bad expected GDP growth imply that
in all the countries in our sample uncertainty about GDP growth increased exchange rate
pressures in the pre-crisis period (before July 1997) and after mid-1999 (Figure 7). During the
intermediate period, in some countries uncertainty about the growth outlook had a signi¿cant
attenuating effect on exchange rate pressures. This effect was temporary and was greatest
at the time of the Russian crisis (end-1998), which coincided with a period of low expected
growth.
These results are robust to the de¿nition of exchange rate pressure indices and to the
location of the threshold separating good from bad growth outlook. Moreover, the signi¿cant
role of uncertainty even in the SUH￿FULVLV period alone implies that the collapse of the exchange
rate regime in most countries in the sample is not the sole determinant of our results.
While a welfare analysis of the provision of public information is beyond the scope
of this paper, our results do shed light on whether a country may better resist a speculative
attack on its currency when the precision of the of¿cial information it releases is high. Both
theoretical and empirical results suggest that the precision of public information may either
help or hurt a country under attack, depending on the state of fundamentals. The theoretical
model predicts that the precision of public information helps when expected fundamentals
are good, but hurts when they are bad. Unsurprisingly, transparent policies may then bene¿t
“virtuous” countries. The empirical results suggest that at the onset of the Asian crisis, when30
expected fundamentals were still relatively good but uncertainty was increasing, a higher
precision of of¿cial information would have been bene¿cial. At the same time, there is
some indication that during some phases of the crisis uncertainty about the economic outlook
may have dampened speculative pressures. However, appropriate discussion of the welfare
implications of the precision of of¿cial information would require developing a theoretical
model in which speculators factor the authorities’ strategy of information releasing into their
decisions.
Futuretheoretical research could alsoverifywhether theeffect oftheprecisions ofpublic
and private information on the share of speculators who decide to attack the currency is robust
to the choice of the payoff function and the probability distribution. Relaxing the assumption
of exogenous fundamentals and exploring the consequences of exchange rate changes that
have feedback effects on economic fundamentals could also have interesting implications.
Future empirical research is also needed to verify whether data on other well-known
currency crises in Latin America and Europe con¿rm the statistical signi¿cance of uncertainty
about fundamentals. There may also be scope for an empirical veri¿cation of the multiple
equilibriamodelwithregimeswitching econometrictechniquesasin Jeanne(1997) andJeanne
and Masson (2000). While testing the leading indicator properties of the mean and variance
of Consensus Economics forecasts is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be worthwhile
exploring whether these variables can enhance the predictive power of early warning systems,
which arecurrently based only onpast fundamentals. Inthisregard, theresultsof ourestimates
on the pre-crisis period are promising.$SSHQGL[ ,￿ $ PRGHO ZLWK RQO\ SXEOLF LQIRUPDWLRQ
In this section we derive the effects of the mean of speculators’ expectations and of
the precision of public information in a model with only public information. This model is
relevant because it implies effects of the mean and precision of public information similar
to those of the unique-equilibrium model of Section 2.2, even though multiple equilibria are
now possible.
27 Speci¿cally, also in this model, the way in which uncertainty contributes to
currency crises depends on the expected level of fundamentals, thereby providing some further
theoretical support to the empirical evidence of Section 4.
We assume that speculators have expectations about w given by the same probability
distribution X considered in Section 2.2￿ namely, X ￿ ￿Jo6E+c￿*k￿. As the government
observes both w and , before taking his decision, his optimal strategy is the same function, ￿,
as in the complete information model. Therefore, if w falls within E￿4cfo the government
devalues the currency, whilst if w falls within E￿cn4￿ the government maintains the peg.
When w belongs to Efc￿o, speculators’ expectations will determine the outcome of the game.
Given ￿, we can focus on the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the reduced-form game of
speculators. We need to calculate the expected payoff – denoted by ￿E@￿c@ 3￿￿ – of a speculator
who attacks the currency when all other speculators also attack and the expected payoff –
denoted by ￿E@￿c_ 3￿￿ – of a speculator who attacks the currency when none do. Analytically















where # is the probability density function of X. The following proposition speci¿es the
Bayesian Nash equilibria of the reduced-form game of speculators:
5: In the unique-equilibrium model with both public and private information, comparative statics exercises
predicted the likelihood of a speculative attack. In the model with only public information of this Appendix,
which may yield multiple equilibria, we refer to a change in the likelihood of an attack more loosely – as it is
common in the literature on speculative attacks – by relating it to the change in the UDQJH RI SDUDPHWHUV in which
the attack is an equilibrium.32
Proposition 4 7KH ￿‡DWWDFN·￿ VWUDWHJ\ SUR¿OH LQ ZKLFK DOO DJHQWV DWWDFN WKH FXUUHQF\ LV DQ
HTXLOLEULXP LII ￿E@￿c@ 3￿￿ ￿ f￿ 7KH ￿‡GRQ¶W￿DWWDFN·￿ VWUDWHJ\ SUR¿OH LQ ZKLFK DOO DJHQWV UHIUDLQ
IURP DWWDFNLQJ LV DQ HTXLOLEULXP LII ￿E@￿c_ 3￿￿ ￿ f￿
As ￿E@￿c@ 3￿￿ is always greater than or equal to ￿E@￿c_ 3￿￿,t h e“attack,” the “don’t-
attack,” or both strategy pro¿les are equilibria of this game. Let us rewrite the two expected
payoffs as:











￿ | , (11)
where x is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. By
rearranging those expressions, we obtain a necessary and suf¿cient condition for the “attack”













Therefore, this incomplete information model may have multiple equilibria or a unique
equilibrium depending on whether condition (12) is or is not ful¿lled.
28 We can now examine
the effects of + and k on both the attack and the no-attack strategy pro¿les, irrespective of the
number of equilibria. These effects are summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 5 ￿L￿ %RWK ￿E@￿c@ 3￿￿ DQG ￿E@￿c_ 3￿￿ DUH GHFUHDVLQJ LQ +￿ ￿LL￿ ￿E@￿c@ 3￿￿ LV
GHFUHDVLQJ ￿LQFUHDVLQJ￿ LQ k LI +:￿ ￿+￿￿￿￿ ￿LLL￿ ￿E@￿c_ 3￿￿ LV GHFUHDVLQJ ￿LQFUHDVLQJ￿ LQ
k LI +:f ￿+￿f￿￿




















5; Note that, given G, w,a n d|,c h a n g e si n￿ (i.e. changes in speculators’ uncertainty about ￿) may produce
a VKLIW from a model with multiple equilibria to a model with a unique equilibrium. Hence, one can ¿nd examples
in which modi¿cations in uncertainty trigger a speculative attack, even if the mean of speculators’ expectations |
does not change. This feature of currency crisis games is further analyzed in Sbracia and Zaghini (2001).33
where ￿ is the probability density function of a standard normal distribution. Thus, both
derivatives are always negative.
Differentiating with respect to k we obtain:
_
_k























Therefore, the derivative of ￿E@￿c@ 3￿￿ is negative (positive), provided that +:￿E +￿￿￿￿ the
derivative of ￿E@￿c_ 3￿￿ is negative (positive), provided that +:fE +￿f￿.
An increase in the mean +, by reducing ￿E@￿c@ 3￿￿ and ￿E@￿c_ 3￿￿, shrinks the range of
parameter values for which the attack strategy pro¿le is an equilibrium and enlarges the range
of parameter values for which the don’t-attack strategy pro¿le is an equilibrium. In other
words, an improvement in the expected fundamental always makes it less likely that the attack
strategy pro¿le will be an equilibrium and more likely that the no-attack strategy pro¿le will
be.
Proposition 6 also states that the effect of the precision of the public signal, k, depends
on the expected fundamental +. Speci¿cally, if k increases and expected fundamentals are
suf¿ciently good (bad), it becomes less (more) likely that the attack strategy pro¿le will be
an equilibrium and more (less) likely that the don’t-attack strategy pro¿le will be. In order
to understand this dependence of the effect of k on the mean +, recall that an increase in k
makes speculators more con¿dent that the fundamental w is in a neighborhood of +. Therefore,
when + is suf¿ciently good, the increase in k makes all speculators more con¿dent that the peg
will hold, dampening their willingness to attack. Conversely, when + is suf¿ciently bad, more
precise public signals strengthen speculators’ con¿dence that the currency will depreciate,
driving them to attack the peg.
29
Thus, despitethe differences inthe number of equilibria andintheinformationstructure,
these results con¿rm that in thepresenceof multiple equilibriathe mean and varianceof public
information have effects comparable to those they have in the unique-equilibrium model of
Section 2.2.
5< Note also that for intermediate values of | (3 ?|?4), if ￿ increases, there is a widening of the range of
parameters in which both the attack and the don’t attack strategy pro¿les are equilibria of the game.$SSHQGL[ ,,￿ (TXLOLEULXP RI WKH SXEOLF DQG SULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ JDPH
In this section we characterize the unique equilibrium of the game with both public
and private information. To provide an intuition for the mechanism leading to a unique
equilibrium, we can use the LQIHFWLRQ DUJXPHQW, as in Morris et al. (1995). Suppose that a
speculator is known to undertake a certain action given some (private) information set. This
knowledge might imply a unique best response by the other speculators given some of their
information sets where the ¿rst information set is considered possible. This, in turn, may
imply that the original speculator responds to that knowledge by choosing that same action
on a larger information set, and so on. In the currency crisis game, if private information is
suf¿ciently precise, this chain of reasoning results in a unique action pro¿le, eliciting a unique
equilibrium.
We now turn to the problem of characterizing the equilibrium. Morris and Shin (1998
and 2002a) and Metz (2002) have shown that the unique equilibrium can be speci¿ed by a
couple E%Wcw
W￿, such that speculators use a trigger strategy
BE%￿’
￿
DWWDFN if % ￿ %W
GRQ¶W DWWDFN if %:% W ,








Here, we ¿rst assume that agents use a trigger strategy like B￿ we then derive a suf¿cient
condition granting that unique values of %W and w
W exist￿¿ nally, we ¿nd the equations that
characterize these values. We do not show that under the suf¿cient condition a trigger strategy
for speculators is the unique optimal strategy, as this result follows directly from Morris and
Shin (2002a) or, in a more general framework, from Frankel et al. (2002).
63 Given ￿, the share of attackers is completely determined by ￿, since we have assumed that there is a
continuum of speculators. It follows that when speculators use ￿, the function # below is exactly the same as the
government’s decision rule speci¿ed in Section2 (which was therefore denoted by the same symbol #).35
&XW￿RII SRLQWV
Assume that agents use the trigger strategy B de¿ned above and let us ¿nd the trigger









As the expected utility from abandoning the peg is nil, the government is indifferent between










Equation (13) implicitly de¿nes w
W as a function of %W. Note that x is decreasing and
continuous in w
W, and takes all the values in the open interval Efc￿￿. Therefore, there exists a
unique value of w
W that solves (13), for any %W 5? .
Let us ¿nd the trigger point for speculators. Given ￿, the expected utility of a speculator
who receives a message % and attacks the currency is:
E( ￿ |￿ ￿￿hEX ￿ w
W m %￿ ￿ | ￿ ￿hEX :w
W m %￿’( ￿￿hEX ￿ w
W m %￿ ￿ | .
As the expected utility from GRQ¶W DWWDFN is nil, a speculator is indifferent between attacking















￿ | ’f. (14)
6XI¿FLHQW FRQGLWLRQ IRU D XQLTXH HTXLOLEULXP
Unlike equation (13), equation (14) does not necessarily have a unique solution. Note
that, as %W goes to ￿4, the left-hand side of equation (14) goes to ( ￿ |:f￿ when %W goes
to n4, the left-hand side of equation (14) goes to ￿|￿f. By the continuity of the left-hand
side of (14), a suf¿cient condition granting that a unique solution to equation (14) exists may
be obtained by requiring that the derivative of the left-hand side of (14) with respect to %W is36
smaller than zero￿ namely:
( ￿
s





























￿ f . (15)
























































Rearranging the previous inequality – and recalling that the maximum of ￿ is ￿*
s
2Z – we
obtain the suf¿cient condition (1).
(TXLOLEULXP
Given the suf¿cient condition (1), the unique equilibrium is characterized by E%Wcw
W￿






















￿ | . (17)$SSHQGL[ ,,,￿ 3URRIV IRU SURSRVLWLRQV ￿ DQG ￿
In order to derive the effects of the parameters +, k, q on E%Wcw
W￿ the system (17) can

















































In the following, by differentiating the system of implicit equations (17) (or the alternative
expressions (19)) we simultaneously obtain the effect of each parameter on both w
W and %W,
thereby proving both propositions 2 and 3.
(IIHFWV RI +


















































Therefore, the derivative of w
W with respect to + is negative, provided that q:k 2￿
2.B u tt h i s
inequality certainly holds under the suf¿cient condition (1). Hence, _w
W*_+ is negative and, in
turn, _%W*_+ is negative too.38
(IIHFWV RI k
In order to derive the effect of k on w








































































The suf¿cient condition for a unique equilibrium (1) grants that the second term on the
right-hand side of the previous equation is positive. By rearranging the third term, we ¿nd that
the derivative of w
W with respect to k is negative, provided that condition (2) holds.
Let us turn to the effect of k on %W. Differentiating the ¿rst equation of system (17) with
































As the term in brackets is positive, the sign of the derivative of %W is the same as the sign of
the derivative of w
W.
(IIHFW RI q RQ w
W












































































The ¿rst two terms on the right-hand side of the previous equation are positive. By rearranging
t h et h i r dt e r m ,w eg e tt h a tt h ed e r i v a t i v eo fw
W with respect to q is positive, provided that
condition (3) holds.
(IIHFW RI q RQ %W


























W*_q previously found wecanget–after sometediousalgebra
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Figure 1:   Mean and median forecasts of GDP growth
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Figure 2:   Standard deviation and mean absolute median difference of GDP growth
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Note: the thick line is the share of attackers (as a function of θ)f o r
α = β = t =1 , D =2 ,a n dy =0 .6 (y is “good” since x∗ ' 0.268). The
thin line is the share of attackers for β increased to 4 (x∗ raises to 0.444).
T h ed o t t e dl i n es i n g l e so u tt h eindirect eﬀect of β as it shows the share of
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Figure 6: Recursive estimates of the threshold
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Figure 7:   Overall effect of uncertainty on exchange rate pressures
in estimates with recursive threshold
(1996:07-2001:05)





Singapore Hong Kongγ0,j -10.645 *** -1.654 -17.254 *** -13.830 *** -18.052 *** 6.885 **
(3.234) (1.347) (3.521) (2.318) (6.509) (3.439)
γ1       -0.520 ***
(0.085)
γ2      0.592 ***
(0.066)
γj 1.360 1.151 0.495 0.160 3.468 *** -0.710
(0.971) (0.946) (1.312) (1.249) (1.310) (1.439)
γ3,j 0.142 *** 0.047 *** 0.238 *** 0.165 *** 0.184 *** -0.046 *
(0.035) (0.015) (0.042) (0.022) (0.058) (0.027)
ρj 0.340 *** 0.283 ** 0.503 *** 0.345 *** 0.203 ** 0.294 ***
(0.088) (0.125) (0.090) (0.082) (0.085) (0.092)
   R
2 
0.330 0.647 0.518 0.475 0.227 0.389
   DW  1.626 1.971 1.538 1.806 1.695 2.276
   Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76
1 Data are monthly.   
  Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, and ten percent levels.
  The coefficients γ1 and γ2 are restricted to be the same across countries.
(SUR estimates; standard errors in parenthesis; sample: 1995:03-2001:05 )
1
Table 1.  Exchange Rate Pressure (IND3 Index ) Estimates
Thailand Indonesia Hong Kong South Korea Malaysia Singaporeγ0,j -6.720 *** -1.193 -11.187 *** -4.630 *** -8.223 6.385 **
(2.569) (1.528) (2.865) (1.775) (5.484) (2.719)
γ1       -0.203 **
(0.081)
γ2      0.333 ***
(0.067)
γj 0.954 -1.582 -0.592 0.933 4.719 ** 0.328
(1.447) (1.699) (2.204) (1.857) (2.140) (2.162)
γ3,j 0.083 *** 0.018 0.144 *** 0.056 *** 0.084 * -0.048 **
(0.029) (0.017) (0.034) (0.017) (0.049) (0.022)
ρj 0.173 ** 0.308 ** 0.304 *** 0.138 0.089 0.135
(0.088) (0.126) (0.098) (0.087) (0.086) (0.090)
   R
2 
0.233 0.281 0.440 0.221 0.087 0.121
   DW  1.590 1.912 1.500 1.706 1.593 2.252
   Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76
1 Data are monthly.   
  Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, and ten percent levels.
  The coefficients γ1 and γ2 are restricted to be the same across countries.
(SUR estimates; standard errors in parenthesis; sample: 1995:03-2001:05 )
1
Table 2.  Exchange Rate Pressure (IND2 Index ) Estimates
Thailand Indonesia Hong Kong South Korea Malaysia Singaporeγ0,j -30.862 *** -7.491 *** -26.437 *** -23.790 *** -26.928 *** 19.706 ***
(7.044) (2.184) (4.356) (3.528) (7.693) (7.097)
γ1       -0.641 ***
(0.130)
γ2      0.623 ***
(0.094)
γj 1.511 -0.702 0.505 -1.660 5.530 *** 2.820
(1.254) (1.080) (1.076) (1.746) (1.532) (2.018)
γ3,j 0.374 *** 0.117 *** 0.361 *** 0.269 *** 0.275 *** -0.136 **
(0.076) (0.026) (0.054) (0.034) (0.069) (0.056)
ρ1,j 0.568 *** 0.443 *** 1.076 *** 0.330 *** 0.514 *** 0.510 ***
(0.096) (0.102) (0.083) (0.081) (0.075) (0.088)
ρ2,j -0.123 * 0.148 * -0.452 *** 0.037 -0.255 *** 0.170 **
(0.072) (0.081) (0.069) (0.074) (0.071) (0.078)
   R
2 
0.258 0.452 0.599 0.323 0.297 0.353
   DW  1.815 2.170 1.853 1.894 1.959 2.245
   Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76
1 Data are monthly.   
  Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, and ten percent levels.
  The coefficients γ1 and γ2 are restricted to be the same across countries.
(SUR estimates; standard errors in parenthesis; sample: 1995:03-2001:05 )
1
Table 3.  Exchange Rate Pressure (BIS Index ) Estimates
Thailand Indonesia Hong Kong South Korea Malaysia Singaporeγ1 -1.450 *** -1.140 *** -1.632 ***
(0.328) (0.227) (0.427)
γ2 3.073 *** 2.198 *** 3.185 ***
(0.862) (0.642) (1.098)
γ 7.297 *** 7.572 *** 6.996 ***
(0.267) (0.344) (0.244)
γ3 -0.008 -0.025 0.029
(0.024) (0.018) (0.029)
ρ 0.375 *** 0.149 * 0.608 ***
(0.066) (0.077) (0.065)
   R
2 
0.384 0.094 0.392
   DW  1.507 1.477 1.577
   Observations 174 174 174
1 Data are monthly.   
  Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, and ten percent levels.
  The panel includes Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong.
(fixed-effect panel estimates with SUR standard errors in parenthesis; sample: 1995:03-1997:07 )
1
Table 4.  Exchange Rate Pressure Estimates on Pre-Crisis Sample
IND3 IND2 BISγ0,j -9.609 -1.294 -12.448 -14.402 * -18.941 7.397
(8.147) (1.604) (8.576) (8.020) (12.549) (6.090)
γ1       -0.290 *
(0.159)
γ2      0.400 ***
(0.085)
γj estimated recursively (see Fig. 6)
γ3,j 0.113 0.034 * 0.168 * 0.153 ** 0.178 -0.062
(0.087) (0.020) (0.102) (0.071) (0.113) (0.046)
ρj 0.385 ** 0.250 0.487 * 0.418 0.285 0.154
(0.159) (0.182) 0.264 (0.273) (0.209) (0.207)
   Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76
1 Data are monthly.   
  Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, and ten percent levels.
  The coefficients γ1 and γ2 are restricted to be the same across countries.
(state-space estimates; standard errors in parenthesis; sample: 1995:03-2001:05 )
1
Table 5.  Exchange Rate Pressure (IND3 Index ) Estimates with recursive threshold
Thailand Indonesia Hong Kong South Korea Malaysia Singapore5HIHUHQFHV
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